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With the removal of statute-based anti-takeover provisions during the aftermath of Asian crisis, a 
significant number of Korean firms started to introduce charter-based measures. In this paper, we make 
use of this unique situation where firm-level anti-takeover provisions (ATP) vary over time (making firm 
fixed effects regression feasible) and its amendment requires a shareholder approval (making event study 
feasible), when investigating the link between ATP and firm performance. Using a sample during 1999-
2009, we find that firms with charter-based anti-takeover provisions are smaller in size, have lower inside 
and foreign ownerships, and upon adoption, experience lower share prices, the extent of which drops with 
inside ownership. Consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis in Jensen (1986), we also find that these 
firms increase capital expenditure. Our finding also shows that ATP adoptions are followed by lower 
profitability and lower dividend payouts. Firms with ATPs also experience greater de-listings after the 
global financial crisis. 
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When investigating the relationship between anti-takeover provisions (ATP) and firm performance, most 
of the empirical work in the existing literature studies U.S. firms (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003, 
Bebchuk, Masulis, Wang, and Xie 2007, and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009).3 Also, given the time-
invariant nature of U.S. anti-takeover measures, firm fixed effects regressions, which control for 
unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics, are usually not feasible. For this reason, Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003) reject the use of firm fixed effects regressions. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) try 
industry fixed effects in their robustness check, but make no attempts to try firm fixed effects. Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) do run firm fixed effects regressions, but finds evidence of entrenchment effect 
only for a subset of anti-takeover provisions.  
Moreover, most of the anti-takeover provisions are not charter-based, which means that boards can 
adopt them without shareholders’ approval. This makes most of the anti-takeover provisions subject to the 
shadow pill problem à la Coates (2000) and makes event studies meaningless. That is, given the ease to 
adopt anti-takeover provisions via board decision, market participants view as if such provisions are 
already in place and share prices reflect the entrenchment effect even before their adoptions. Last but not 
least, the adoption of anti-takeover measures is an endogenous choice variable. A manager foreseeing the 
fall in share price, and therefore concerned with the heightened possibility of hostile takeover, may 
choose to introduce anti-takeover measures. In this case, the causality is running from firm value to the 
adoption of anti-takeover measures, not the other way around.  
In this paper, we attempt to overcome these four shortcomings or challenges by making use of a 
unique situation in Korea. Before the Asian crisis, no Korean firm adopted charter-based ATPs, such as 
supermajority requirement on director dismissals, golden parachutes, supermajority requirement on 
mergers, and so on. Although, their adoption was not illegal, firms did not adopt any as they were already 
protected by statute-based anti-takeover provisions. The removal of statute-based anti-takeover provisions 
during the aftermath of the Asian crisis, however, created a totally new environment. Individual firms 
were forced to make decisions whether or not to adopt ATPs. This abrupt shift in environment, in our 
view, constitutes an experimental setting.4  
                                                 
3
 There are a limited number of exceptions, which include Lange, Ramsay, and Woo (2000) that studies Australian 
anti-takeover devices and Arikawa and Mitsusada (2008) and Kato, Fabre, and Westerholm (2009) that studies 
poison pills in Japan. 
4
 To constitute a natural experiment, (i) we need to have an exogenous shock and (2) this shock must be treated to a 
subset so that we have a control group, against which we evaluate the treatment effect. The setting we investigate in 
our paper, however, lacks the second requirement, which is why we do not use the term natural experiment, but 
prefer to use the term quasi-experiment.  
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During the post-crisis period, a significant number of Korean firms started to introduce charter-
based ATPs. This created a setting, where one can have within-firm variation in ATPs and which allows 
one to investigate the relationship between ATPs and firm performance in a firm fixed effects framework. 
Also, given that all the provisions newly introduced are charter-based that require shareholders’ approval, 
we are not subject to the shadow pill problem that often plagues U.S. studies. Moreover, their adoption at 
the shareholders’ meeting is an unexpected news item that constitutes a valid event, allowing one to 
conduct meaningful event studies. Firm fixed effects regressions and event studies greatly alleviate the 
endogeneity problem since it investigates whether firm value drops when it should. In other words, we 
have identification in time.5   
Besides providing evidence outside of U.S. and using firm fixed effects regressions and event 
studies, this paper makes another contribution to the literature by investigating anti-takeover measures in 
a country setting where firms typically have concentrated ownership structure. Specifically, we 
investigate how the level of inside ownership – control rights, to be exact – is associated with the choice 
of anti-takeover provisions. Also, we study how the link between anti-takeover provisions and firm 
performance is influenced by the level of inside ownership.  
Using public firms in Korea, over 1999-2009, we first investigate the factors behind the adoption of 
anti-takeover provisions. We find that firms with charter-based anti-takeover provisions have lower inside 
ownership, lower foreign ownership, and smaller firm size. We then ask our main question whether anti-
takeover charter amendments are associated with lower firm value, and if so, why? Using the same 
sample of firms, we find that firms with anti-takeover provisions experience lower share prices. This is so 
in our event studies and also in our firm fixed effects regressions. We also find that the extent of such 
share price drop is greater for firms with low inside ownership, suggesting that the level of inside 
ownership and charter-based anti-takeover measures are substitutes.  
We next test three hypotheses that identify the channels through which the adoption of anti-
takeover measures lead to lower firm value. The channels we investigate include investment (capital 
expenditure), profitability, and dividend payouts. Consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis in Jensen 
(1986), we find that firms with anti-takeover measures experience higher capital expenditures, lower 
profitability, and lower dividend payouts. Lastly, we test how firms with anti-takeover provisions fared 
during the global financial crisis by investigating the firms that were delisted either in 2009 or 2010. We 
find that firms with anti-takeover provisions resulted in a greater number of de-listings than the ones 
without such provisions.  
                                                 
5
 In some sense, firm fixed effects regressions and event studies are equivalent to difference-in-difference (DiD) 
analyses with a relatively crude treatment group.  
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Testing the entrenchment effect of anti-takeover charter amendments can also shed light on the 
current policy debate in Korea over the adoption of poison pill. The present Commercial Code in Korea 
does not allow firms to issue poison pills. The government, however, proposed a Commercial Code 
revision bill in 2010 that allows it. Even though we do not directly study poison pills in this paper, we can 
make inference about their consequences. This is because the anti-takeover measures we study are weaker 
defense tools, and if we find evidence of managerial entrenchment from them, we can safely infer the 
existence of entrenchment effect from a stronger defense tool, such as poison pill. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the anti-takeover devices in Korea, with a 
focus on charter-based anti-takeover provisions, which is the main subject of this paper. We also briefly 
discuss the recent debate in Korea whether to introduce poison pill. Section 3 outlines our hypotheses and 
section 4 explains the data and the sample.  Section 5 provides the empirical results and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Anti-Takeover Measures in Korea 
 
A. Statute-Based Anti-Takeover Provisions before the Crisis 
 
Before the financial crisis in 1997, Korean corporate managers were fully entrenched. Until Dec. 1996, 
they were protected by the 10 percent rule in the Securities and Exchange Act. Under this rule, no 
shareholder, besides the controlling shareholder at the time of IPO, can own more than 10 percent of 
voting shares in public companies. This rule, which existed since 1976, was necessary in earlier years to 
induce Korean firms to publicly float their shares on the stock exchange and thereby enlarge the size of 
the Korean capital market.  
In January 1997, this rule was replaced by three others.6 One was a mandatory bid rule in the 
Securities and Exchange Act, where any shareholder acquiring more than 25 percent of voting shares, 
must acquire additional shares to own more than 50 percent of the total voting rights. Given the chronic 
scarcity of capital in those years and the difficulty to externally finance acquisition deals, this rule was 
also regarded as a statute-based anti-takeover device. The other two rules were against foreign 
acquisitions. Foreign Investment and Foreign Capital Inducement Act introduced a rule where any 
foreigner wishing to acquire more than 10 percent of pre-existing shares must obtain board approval. It 
                                                 
6
 The 10 percent rule was removed from the Securities and Exchange Act in 1994, but with the grace period of 3 
years, it lasted until the end of 1996. It was also in January 1994, when the Securities and Exchange Act allowed 
Korean firms to engage in stock repurchases and strengthened the 5 percent block holding disclosure requirement 
(adding shares owned by related-party into the calculation of 5 percent).  
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also introduced a rule where any foreigner wishing to acquire shares of a large firm (book asset value 
above 2 trillion won) must obtain approval from the Minister of Finance and Economy. By law, the 
Minister was obliged to approve the acquisition if aggregate foreign ownership was less than 15 percent 
of total outstanding shares and no foreigner can become the largest shareholder.  
These three rules, however, lasted only a year. As part of an effort to induce foreign capital inflow 
during the aftermath of the financial crisis, Korean government repealed all three rules in February 1998. 
The limit on foreign aggregate ownership, which increased gradually from 10 percent in Jan. 1992 to 26 
percent in Nov. 1997, also jumped to 50 percent in Dec. 1997 and then finally lifted to 100 percent in 
May 1998.  
 
B. Charter-Based Anti-Takeover Provisions after the Crisis 
 
Dominated by firms with concentrated family ownership, hostile takeover threats are limited in Korea.7 
But, a number of factors lead a significant number of Korean firms to adopt charter-based anti-takeover 
provisions in recent years. First, foreign investment in Korea Exchange (KRX) increased significantly 
since the limit on foreign aggregate ownership was lifted in 1998. According to Financial Supervisory 
Service (FSS), foreigners’ 18.6 percent share of total market capitalization increased to 42.0 percent in 
2004 (excluding KOSDAQ market). As of December 2009, they take up 32.6 percent. According to FSS, 
the number of foreign block holdings (ownership above 5%) also increased to 406 block holders in 614 
companies as of Dec. 2007.  
Second, a number of prominent shareholder activism cases led by foreign investors served as a 
wake-up call for Korean managers. Such examples include the proxy fight between Sovereign Asset 
Management and SK (2004 and 2005) and that of Icahn Partners Master Fund and KT&G (2006). Though 
these activists did not have the intension to acquire control, Korean managers in general took the matter 
seriously and started to entrench themselves by adopting charter-based anti-takeover measures. It was also 
around this time when stock repurchase suddenly became a popular anti-takeover device. By selling 
treasury stocks to friendly shareholders, incumbent managers were able to strengthen their de facto voting 
rights.  
Third, the absence of statute-based anti-takeover measures obviously must have influenced firms to 
adopt charter-based measures. Since the proxy fight between Sovereign Asset Management and SK, there 
                                                 
7
 According to Kim (2010), during the recent past 10 years (2000-2009), there were only a total of 15 cases reported 
as hostile tender offers in Korea. Among the 15 cases, 4 failed, including the one launched by a foreigner. According 
to the same source, there were only a total of 55 cases reported as hostile proxy flights over board seats, during the 
recent past five years (2005-2009). Among the 55 cases, only 6 succeeded to take over the board. 
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were calls from the business community to allow poison pill, dual class shares, and many others. But no 
action was taken by the government until 2010 when Ministry of Justice submitted to the National 
Assembly the Commercial Code revision bill that allows poison pill. During this period, anxious 
managers devised their own anti-takeover measures and secured charter amendments.  
According to the Solidarity for Economic Reform (SER), a civil organization, the newly emerging 
charter-based anti-takeover measures can be categorized into six types: (i) supermajority requirement 
when dismissing directors, (ii) prohibiting dismissal of directors above a certain percentage, (iii) golden 
parachutes, (iv) supermajority requirement for mergers, (v) supermajority requirement for control-related 
charter amendments, and (vi) delaying the effective date of control-related charter amendments.8 SER 
(2009) also documents detailed examples of each measure. For example, the corporate charter of 
Curocom (a banking solution provider) requires 90 percent or higher approval by participating shares and 
80 percent or higher approval by outstanding shares to dismiss a director. This requirement is 
substantially higher than the one prescribed in the Commercial Code.9 Maniker (a meat processing 
company), on the other hand, has a corporate charter that limits the fraction of dismissed directors to be 
below one fourth of directors that were serving at the end of last fiscal year. Another example is Pointi (a 
mobile solution provider), which has a golden parachute provision in its corporate charter. According to 
this provision, the representative director of Pointi can claim 10 billion won (approximately 10 million 
US dollars) upon his dismissal in the event of hostile takeover.  
Biosmart (a magnetic stripe card manufacturer) has a supermajority requirement for mergers. If a 
merger is determined by board decision as hostile, a merger requires 90 percent or higher approval by 
participating shares and 70 percent of higher approval by outstanding shares. Again, this requirement is 
substantially higher than the one prescribed in the Commercial Code.10 Another example is Curoholdings 
(a semiconductor testing device manufacturer), which is subject to a supermajority requirement on 
control-related charter amendments. In its charter, it first has a provision regarding supermajority 
requirement on director dismissals. It then has another provision that requires a supermajority approval to 
amend the first provision. Synopexgreentech (a machinery equipment manufacturer), on the other hand, 
has a golden parachute (5 billion won) provision in its charter and also a provision that delays the 
effective date if one amends the golden parachute provision. 
 
C. Debate over Poison Pill 
                                                 
8
 See SER (2009). 
9
 To dismiss a director, the Commercial Code requires approval by at least two thirds of participating shares and 
one third of outstanding shares. 
10
 According to the Commercial Code, a merger requires approval by at least two thirds of participating shares and 
one third of outstanding shares.  
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As mentioned earlier, in 2010, the Korean government submitted to the National Assembly a Commercial 
Code revision bill that allows poison pill. The proposed pill, however, has a number of unique features 
that differentiates it from the ones popularly adopted in the U.S. First, it is a charter-based anti-takeover 
measure. That is, the board’s decision to issue poison pill must be based on a provision in the corporate 
charter. Second, when issuing poison pill, board must obtain approval from at least two thirds of board 
members.  
Despite such features, critics argue that the pill is more likely to be misused and eventually harm 
corporate performance, especially in a country setting like the one in Korea, where independent board 
members are rare, outside monitoring by institutional investors is weak, and level of control-related 
private benefits are high.11 They also criticize government’s justification for allowing the pill. One of 
government’s arguments is that, in the absence of statute-based anti-takeover measures, firms excessively 
engage in stock repurchases, which divert corporate resources away from productive activities. For the 
government’s argument to be justified, firms should experience higher firm value and increased capital 
expenditure during the post-pill period. The critics, however, predict otherwise. That is, managers will 
effectively entrench themselves and engage in value-decreasing investments, which will lower firm value.  
We believe the empirical results of our study can shed light on this debate. Even though we do not 
directly study poison pill, we can make inference about its consequences by examining the anti-takeover 
measures of our study. This is justified because, compared to poison pill, the measures we study in this 
paper are weaker anti-takeover tools. If we find evidence of managerial entrenchment from a weaker ATP, 




A. Which Firms Choose to Adopt Anti-Takeover Measures? 
 
We first investigate the factors that motivate corporate insiders to adopt anti-takeover charter provisions. 
Here, we consider two factors: inside ownership and firm size. First, we hypothesize that firms with lower 
inside control are more likely to adopt charter-based anti-takeover measures. This is self-explanatory. 
Firms with concentrated ownership are insulated from hostile takeover threats, and therefore should not 
have much incentive to adopt anti-takeover measures.  
                                                 
11
 For detailed criticism against the proposal, see Kim (2010). 
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Second, we investigate if firm size matters. One view is that large firm size serves as an effective 
takeover defense, since it takes more resources to acquire a larger target. According to this view, larger 
firms would have less incentive to adopt ATPs, thus resulting in a negative relationship between firm size 
and ATP. An alternative view is that firms with more ATPs are more likely to be a bidder and this leads 
to a larger firm size, thus resulting in a positive relationship between the two (see Masulis, Wang, and Xie 
2007, Offenberg 2009, Humphery-Jenner and Powell 2011). Yet there is another story specific to Korea. 
Given that charter-based anti-takeover provisions were relatively new and therefore firms did not want to 
draw attention, one hypothesize that smaller firms that are seldom covered by the media or by equity 
analysts, are more likely to go for anti-takeover charter amendments.  
As an additional control, we also consider foreign ownership. A priori, the relationship is 
ambiguous. If corporate managers are threatened by greater foreign share ownership, and therefore 
motivated to adopt anti-takeover measures, we would see firms with higher foreign ownership more 
frequently adopting anti-takeover measures. But, the opposite relationship may also hold. In the presence 
of high foreign ownership, corporate managers may not be able to secure shareholders’ approval to adopt 
anti-takeover measures, thereby lowering the incidents of anti-takeover charter amendments in firms with 
high foreign ownership. This latter conjecture is consistent with recent papers that document the activist 
roles played by foreign investors (Kim, Kim, and Kwon 2009 and Kim, Sung, and Wei 2010).   
 
B. Are Anti-Takeover Charter Amendments Associated with Lower Firm Value? If So, Why? 
 
The free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986) predicts, in the absence of hostile takeover threats, 
managers with free cash flow tend to invest in value-destroying projects and therefore make less cash 
dividend payouts. One of the key objectives of this paper is to test these predictions using Korean firms. 
Our detailed hypotheses are broken down into five parts. 
First, we test if firms with anti-takeover charter amendments exhibit lower firm value during the 
post-amendment period. If outside shareholder expects that corporate insiders will engage in negative 
NPV projects after adopting charter-based anti-takeover measures, share price will drop immediately after 
their adoption announcements and also remain low for an extended period of time. We test this hypothesis 
using two approaches: event studies and panel regressions. In either case, we also test if the level of inside 
ownership matters. If market participants view the level of inside ownership as a substitute to charter-
based anti-takeover measures, share price reactions will be lower for firms with high inside ownership. As 
for event studies, we also test if firm size matters. As for small cap firms, anti-takeover charter 
amendments may not have drawn much attention from the business media or from equity analysts. This 
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leads to a prediction that firms with larger market cap are more likely to experience negative market 
reactions upon the adoption of anti-takeover measures.  
We next test three hypotheses that identify the channels through which the adoption of anti-
takeover measures may lead to lower firm value. The channels we investigate include investment (capital 
expenditure), profitability, and dividend payouts. Specifically, we test if the adoption of anti-takeover 
measure leads to increased capital expenditure, lower profitability, and lower dividend payouts. Notice 
that these channels are directly related to Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis. Capital expenditure 
increases because managers will engage in more negative NPV projects. Profitability falls because the 
new projects are not profitable. Dividend payouts drop because retained earnings are used to finance new 
projects.  
Lastly, we test how firms with anti-takeover provisions fared during the global financial crisis by 
investigating the firms that were delisted either in 2009 or 2010. If entrenched managers engaged in 
negative NPV projects and thereby lowered profitability, we predict that firms with ATP fared worse 




The data on anti-takeover provisions is from the Economic Reform Research Institute (ERRI), a private 
think tank specialized in economic reform issues in Korea. ERRI collected the data by going through the 
corporate charter of each and every listed firm on the Korea Exchange over a nine year period (2001-
2009).12  
The dark grey bars in the first bar chart in Figure 1 shows the cumulative number of nonfinancial 
listed firms with at least one charter-based ATP over a period of 1999-2009. ATP first emerged in 2001 
and then increased exponentially up until 2008.13 As of 2008, there are 250 nonfinancial firms with at 
least one charter-based ATP. This is approximately 15 percent of all nonfinancial listed firms 
(=250/1,700). The light grey bars use firms that exist throughout the 1999-2008 period. This is to show 
within-firm variation in ATP adoption using a sample free from any improvement in data coverage or 
from new firm listings. These bars clearly show that there exists a significant degree of within-firm 
variation in ATP adoption. 
                                                 
12
 In case of 2009, ERRI collected the data only during Jan-March. Since firms with fiscal year ending in December 
take up approximately 93 percent of all listed firms and they must hold their shareholders’ meeting by March in the 
following year, ERRI’s 2009 data approximately covers 93 percent of listed firms. As for the remaining 7 percent of 
firms, we simply extrapolated the data in 2008.  
13
 ERRI collected the data from 2001. To make sure no ATP adopter exists before then, we went through the 
corporate charters in 1999-2000. We failed to find any during this period.  
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The figure in dark grey bar, however, drops down to 208 firms in 2009. This is largely due to 
massive delisting that took place during the aftermath of global financial crisis. The second bar chart 
effectively shows this. Each bar represents the number of delisted nonfinancial firms from Korea 
Exchange (KRX) in each year. Among the 80 nonfinancial firms delisted in 2009, a disproportionately 
large number of firms (31 firms) were those with anti-takeover provisions. None of the 31 de-listings 
were voluntary.   
Table 1 shows the types of ATPs and the number of firms for each type of provision during the 
entire sample period (2001-2009). The total number of firms with at least one ATP during the entire 
sample period is 250, matching the figure in Figure 1. This indicates that no firm removed such provision 
from their corporate charter during our sample period. Table 1 also shows that the most popular ATP is 
supermajority requirement on director dismissals (197 firms), followed by golden parachute (130 firms), 
and supermajority requirement on control-related charter amendments (119 firms).  
Our default measure of entrenchment in this paper is a dummy variable named ATP, which takes a 
value of 1 if anti-takeover provision (ATP) exists, and 0 otherwise. Since we measure ATP each year, 
ATP is a time-varying dummy. In our robustness tests, we experiment with other entrenchment measures. 
Following the tradition in the existing literature, we try ATP Index, which equals the number of anti-
takeover provisions (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003 and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009). We also 
try ATP N, which takes a value of 1 if at least N number of anti-takeover provisions exists, and 0 
otherwise (see Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell 2010).14  
Table 2 gives definitions (Panel A) and summary statistics (Panel B) of principal variables used in 
our empirical analyses. We compute summary statistics over 1999-2009, the sample period which we use 
to run panel regressions. To allow at least two years of pre-adoption period, we add two years of data 
(1999 and 2000) before the first year of APT adoption (2001). Since capital expenditure is one of our key 
dependent variables, we drop financial firms from all of our panel regressions. Stock returns and market 
capitalizations data are respectively from Korea Capital Market Institute (KCMI) and Korea Exchange 
(KRX). Financial statements and ownership data are from TS2000, a DB compiled by the Korea Listed 
Companies Association (KLCA).  
 
                                                 
14
 There are pros and cons of using ATP dummy over ATP Index. One merit is that we do not have to worry about 
how to assign weights on each provision when constructing an index. Similarly, we do not have to make an arbitrary 
assumption that each provision has equal value. There is a problem though. We are assuming that firms do not get 
more entrenched by adding more anti-takeover provisions. Firms with one ATP are assumed to be equally 
entrenched as firms with all six ATPs. But, using ATP Index that simply counts the number of ATPs is not a 
solution. This is because it ignores that ATPs are to some extent substitutes and that simply adding ATPs do not 
necessarily increase the level of entrenchment proportionately.  
 




A. Which Firms Choose to Adopt Anti-Takeover Measures? 
 
To investigate the factors behind the charter-based anti-takeover amendments, we run Probit regression 
for ATP (1 if anti-takeover provision exists, 0 otherwise). Table 3 shows the results. Column (1) includes 
2-digit industry dummies, while column (2) includes 4-digit industry dummies.15 Both regressions 
include year dummies. Point estimates denote marginal effects on probability. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm. As expected, the coefficient on inside ownership is negative and highly significant, 
indicating that firms with concentrated inside ownership are less likely to adopt charter-based anti-
takeover measures. Alternatively, one can interpret that they are substitutes when it comes to anti-
takeover defense measures. The coefficient of -0.0004 (in column (2)) suggests that a 25%p increase in 
inside ownership drops the probability of ATP adoption by 1%p. Given that pooled sample mean of ATP 
is only 5%, this can be considered as a substantial drop in probability. Table 3 also shows that foreign 
ownership lowers the likelihood of ATP adoption. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant. 
But, the economic magnitude is relatively small. The coefficient of -0.0002 (in column (2)) suggests that 
a 25%p increase in foreign ownership drops the probability of ATP adoption by 0.5%p. One can interpret 
that the monitoring role of foreign investors discourages corporate managers from introducing anti-
takeover provisions.  
The result in Table 3 also shows that smaller firms are more likely to introduce anti-takeover 
charter amendments. The coefficient on firm size is negative and highly significant. This is consistent 
with our earlier conjecture that large firm size serves as an effective takeover defense, since it takes more 
resources to acquire a larger target. According to this view, larger firms would have less incentive to 
adopt ATPs, thus resulting in a negative relationship between firm size and ATP. Our result is also 
consistent with the conjecture that large firms refrain from adopting anti-takeover charter amendments for 
fear of media and analyst attentions. The coefficient of -0.003 (in column (2)) suggests that one standard 
deviation increase in firm size (1.51) drops the probability of ATP adoption by approximately 0.5%p (=-
0.003 x 1.51). On the other hand, operating profit does not show up as a significant factor.  
 
B. Are Anti-Takeover Charter Amendments Associated with Lower Firm Value? If So, Why? 
 
                                                 
15
 We do not include firm fixed effects since it would worsen the incidental parameters problem (unconditional 
fixed effects Probit estimates are biased). Random-effects and population-average Probit models did not converge.  
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We next investigate if firms with anti-takeover charter amendments exhibit lower firm value during the 
post-amendment period. In doing so, we take two approaches: event studies and firm fixed effects 
regressions.  
 
Event Study Results  
 
Figure 2 shows our event study results, where the day of shareholders’ meeting is used as an event day. 
We estimate abnormal returns from market model (KOSDAQ Composite Index for KOSDAQ firms and 
KOSPI for all other listed firms) using past 250 trading days from day -260 to -11 as the estimation period. 
The figures plot cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) from day -10 through day +20.16 The 
first figure (A), which uses the full sample of firms, suggests the existence of negative announcement 
effect. Firms with anti-takeover provisions experience a share price fall of 3% over a 30-day period. Table 
4 shows whether this announcement effect is statistically significant. When average abnormal returns 
(AAR) are cumulated from day -10 (columns (1) and (2)), t-stats are low and CAARs are marginally 
significant only in day +18. This is partly because the CAAR value at day 0 is above zero (0.6%). When 
we cumulate average abnormal returns (AAR) from day 0 (columns (3) and (4)), the statistical 
significance improves substantially. CAAR is significantly different from zero from day +2 and in most 
of the days during the event period.  
We also test if the negative announcement effect strengthens in firms with low inside ownership. If 
market views the level of inside ownership as a substitute to charter-based anti-takeover measures, the 
magnitude of announcement effect would be greater in firms with low inside ownership. The second 
figure (B) shows the test results. We conduct the same event study using a sample restricted to those with 
inside ownership less than 10 percent. The magnitude of share price fall is around 9%, which is 
substantially greater than the one we have seen using the full sample. This is so even if we take into 
account the share price fall that took place before the event day (3.5%). Statistical significance, however, 
is rather weak. When average abnormal returns (AAR) are cumulated from day -10 (Table 4, columns (5) 
and (6)), CAARs are marginally significant in nine days out of a 30-day event period. If we cumulate 
average abnormal returns (AAR) from day 0 (columns (7) and (8)), CAARs are marginally significant in 
five days out of a 30-day event period.  
Next, we test if the negative announcement effect strengthens with firm size. If media and analyst 
coverage facilitate new information to be incorporated in share prices, the magnitude of announcement 
effect would be greater at the time of adoption in firms with large capitalization stocks. To test this, we 
                                                 
16
 To compute CAAR, we first average abnormal returns across sample firms, and then cumulate them over the 
event window. Since we use log returns, this is equivalent to computing average CAR. 
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restrict to firms with market capitalization greater than 50 billion won (approximately 50 million dollar). 
The third figure (C) shows the result. The magnitude of share price fall is around 5%, which is again 
substantially greater than the one when using the full sample. Table 4 shows the statistical significance of 
CAAR. When average abnormal returns (AAR) are cumulated from day -10 (columns (9) and (10)), 
CAARs are insignificant throughout event period. This is probably because the CAAR value at day 0 is 
above zero (1.3%). When we cumulate average abnormal returns (AAR) from day 0 (columns (11) and 
(12)), the statistical significance improves substantially. CAAR is significantly different from zero from 
day +2 and in most of the days during the event period.  
Lastly, we conduct event studies using firms that adopt ATPs, but do not experience a fall in 
NI/Assets during the immediate past fiscal year.17 This is because, in Korea, newly audited earning 
figures are released immediately before the shareholders’ meeting (by regulation, no later than a week 
before) and such announcements may affect share prices. The fourth figure (D) shows the result for ATP 
adopters with inside ownership less than 10% that did not experience drop in NI/Assets. The fifth figure 
(E) shows the result for ATP adopters with market capitalization above 50 billion Korean won that did 
not experience drop in NI/Assets. One can easily observe that the negative share price reactions are much 
sharper in these subsamples. In other words, our finding strengthens as we drop the events that are 
contaminated by new earning announcements.18 
In unreported analyses, we test if share price reacts at the time of meeting notification, which is 
typically two weeks (or 10 business days) before the day of shareholders’ meeting.19 If shareholders react 
at the time of notification, their reaction on the day of shareholders’ meeting may underestimate the true 
wealth effect of entrenchment. The CAR figures, where the notification day is used as day 0, show that 
nothing much happens at the time of notification. One possibility is the uncertainty of ATP’s adoption. 





                                                 
17
 Note that we do not use earnings surprises here. This is because equity analysts in Korea usually do not publish 
earnings forecasts for small firms, which take up a significant fraction of our ATP adopters.    
18
 In unreported figures, we show the results for ATP adopters that did experience a fall in NI/Assets during the 
immediate past fiscal year. We verify that share prices respond negatively even before day 0. This is consistent with 
share price responding to negative earnings announcement, which may dilute the effect of ATP adoption.  
19
 According to the Korean Commercial Code (article 363), the minimum notice period is 14 days, which 
approximately 10 business days. According to Kim (2010), 53% of the firms have a prior notice period of 15 days 
and only 8% of firms have a prior notice period equal to or longer than 21 days.  
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We next turn to firm fixed effects regressions, and test if within-firm adoption of anti-takeover provision 
leads to a within-firm drop in firm value.20 Firm value is measured by Tobin’s q. To fix its skewed 
distribution, we use its logarithm. On top of standard controls, we include lagged Tobin’s q.21 This is to 
control for any auto-correlation in corporate performance, and to control for firm behavior adopting ATP 
after experiencing poor performance. Regressions are estimated over the 1999-2009 period using 
nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Exchange. t-values are based on standard errors clustered by firm.  
Table 5 shows the results. When using the full sample (column (1)), we do not find any association 
between ATP and firm value. The coefficient on ATP is insignificant. So, in columns (2) – (5), we run 
sub-sample regressions, where the sub-samples are grouped by the level of inside ownership. If market 
views the level of inside ownership as a substitute to charter-based anti-takeover measures, the drop in 
firm value would be greater in firms with low inside ownership. The estimated coefficients on ATP 
confirm this conjecture. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant when inside ownership is 
less than 30 percent, and the coefficient magnitude drops monotonically with the level of inside 
ownership, reaching -0.2657 when inside ownership is less than 10 percent (column (5)). As for these 
firms, an adoption of ATP drops ln(Tobin’s q) by 0.266, or Tobin’s q by 26.6 percent. At median Tobin’s 
q value of 0.95 and the median debt/assets ratio of 0.46 in our full sample, this is equivalent to a drop in 
share price by 51 percent.22  
Column (6) adds inside ownership and its interaction terms with ATP on the right-hand side of the 
regression. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically significant, meaning that 
firms with lower inside ownership experience a greater fall in share price upon ATP adoption. The 
coefficient of -0.1402 on ATP and 0.0037 on the interaction term indicate that 37.9 percent 
(=0.1402/0.0037) is the inside ownership threshold, below which ATP charter amendment lowers firm 
value.  
As robustness check, we experimented with industry-adjusted Tobin’s q following Bebchuk (2009). 
In unreported tables, we show that our results remain intact. The coefficient magnitude drops 
                                                 
20
 In the tables reported in this paper, we do not lag our ATP dummy variable. There are two reasons behind this. 
First, ATPs are adopted at the shareholders’ meetings, which are usually held in March. For firms with fiscal year 
ending in December, which take up most of our sample firms, ATP in the same year is already lagged by nine-
month. Second, in case of firm value, there is no reason to believe that it would react with a time lag to the adoption 
of ATP. Nonetheless, we conducted a robustness check where we lagged our ATP dummy variable. Although 
statistical significance weakened, most of our key results remained intact.  
21
 As a robustness test, we tried free cash flows over assets in lieu of operating profits (EBIT) over assets. Our key 
results remain intact.  
22
 Given the median Tobin’s q value of 0.95 and the median debt/asset ratio of 0.46, the median (market value of 
equity/asset) ratio is 0.49 (= 0.95 - 0.46). Also, after a 26.6 percent drop in Tobin’s q, the new Tobin’s q is 0.7 and 
the new (market value of equity/asset) ratio is 0.24 (= 0.7 – 0.46). Provided that the size of asset remains constant, a 
drop of (market value of equity/assets) from 0.49 to 0.24 is a 51 percent drop in market value of equity.  
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monotonically with the level of inside ownership and the coefficient on the interaction term is negative 
and statistically significant.  
We also experimented with other entrenchment measures: ATP Index (equals the number of anti-
takeover provisions) and ATP N (takes a value of 1 if at least N number of anti-takeover provisions exits, 
and 0 otherwise). Our key results in Table 5 remain intact when using ATP Index, ATP 2, and ATP 3. 
These measures are negatively associated with firm’s market value for firms with inside ownership less 
than 10%, and the coefficients are significant either at 1 or 5 percent level. We, however, do not get 
similar results when using ATP 4, ATP 5, or ATP 6. This is most likely because there is very little time 
variation in these variables. Summary statistics in Table 2 Panel B shows that the standard deviations are 




Next, we test the overinvestment hypothesis of Jensen (1986). Investment is measured by capital 
expenditures scaled by previous fiscal year-end total assets. To fix its skewed distribution, we use its 
logarithm. In our regressions, we control for growth opportunity, which is measured by Tobin’s q. Since 
we also control for operating profit, Tobin’s q in our regression captures growth opportunity rather than 
firm performance. Regressions are estimated over the 1999-2009 period using nonfinancial firms listed on 
the Korea Exchange. t-values are based on standard errors clustered by firm.  
Table 6 shows the results. When using the full sample, however, we do not find any association 
between ATP and capital expenditure (column (1)). As in the case of firm value regressions in Table 5, 
we run sub-sample regressions, where the sub-samples are grouped by the level of inside ownership 
(columns (2)-(5)). We find that within-firm adoption of anti-takeover provision leads to a within-firm 
increase in capital expenditure in firms with lower inside ownership. When restricting the sample to those 
with inside ownership less than 10 percent, the coefficient on ATP is 0.7994. As for these firms, an 
adoption of ATP increases ln(CAPEX/Assets) by 0.8 or CAPEX/Assets by 80 percent. This is a 
substantial jump in investment. This result alone does not constitute evidence that firms with ATP engage 
in overinvestment. But, if one puts together this with the evidence in Table 5, one can conclude that most 
of the capital expenditures were value decreasing, consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis of 
Jensen (1986). In the absence of hostile takeover threats (adoption of anti-takeover measures in firms with 
inside ownership less than 10 percent), managers tend to invest in value-destroying projects (increase in 
capital expenditure) and this lowers firm value.  
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Column (6) adds inside ownership and its interaction terms with ATP on the right-hand side of the 
regression. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically significant, meaning that 
firms with lower inside ownership experience a greater increase in capital expenditure upon ATP 
adoption. The coefficient of 0.2275 on ATP and -0.0116 on the interaction term indicate that 24 percent 
(=0.2275/0.0116) is the inside ownership threshold, below which ATP charter amendment increases 
capital expenditure.  
We also experimented with other entrenchment measures: ATP Index (equals the number of anti-
takeover provisions) and ATP N (takes a value of 1 if at least N number of anti-takeover provisions exits, 
and 0 otherwise). Our key results in Table 6 remain intact when using ATP Index, ATP 2, and ATP 3. 
These measures are positively associated with capital expenditure for firms with inside ownership less 
than 10%, and the coefficients are significant either at 1 or 5 percent level. We, however, do not get 
similar results when using ATP 4, ATP 5, or ATP 6. As discussed previously, this is most likely because 
there is very little time variation in these variables. Summary statistics in Table 2 Panel B shows that the 
standard deviations are respectively 0.06, 0.01, and 0.00.   
 
Capital Expenditure and Firm Value 
 
To directly test the link between investment and firm value, we estimate firm fixed effects regression of 
firm’s market value on capital expenditure using various subsamples. Table 7 shows the results. 
Regressions (1) and (6) respectively report sub-sample results for ATP non-adopters and ATP adopters. 
Regressions (2)-(5) and regressions (7)-(10) divide the sample further by the level of inside ownership.  
For ATP non-adopters, capital expenditure is positively associated with firm’s market value, but for 
ATP adopters, there is no connection between capital expenditure and firm’s market value (see 
regressions (1) and (6)). When we limit the sample to those with inside ownership less than 10%, capital 
expenditure is negatively associated with firm’s market value for ATP adopters. But, we do not find this 
for ATP non-adopters. These results support the overinvestment hypothesis of Jensen (1986). It is also 
consistent with the findings of Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009) that link the degree of entrenchment and 
the efficiency of capital expenditure. Using dual-class firms, they report that capital expenditures 
contribute significantly less to shareholder value at firms with a greater divergence between insider voting 
rights and cash flow rights.23 
 
                                                 
23
 Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007), on the other hand, study the efficiency of acquisitions. They find that acquirers 
with more anti-takeover provisions experience significantly lower announcement period abnormal stock returns.  




If entrenched managers invest in value-destroying projects, firm profitability should drop during the post-
adoption period. This is what we find in Table 8 Panel A, where we use three different measures of firm 
profitability (NI/Assets, NI/Equity, and EBIT/Sales). Regardless of our measure of profitability, we find 
that within-firm adoption of anti-takeover provision leads to a within-firm drop in firm profitability.  
The coefficients on ATP are all negative and statistically significant. The economic magnitudes are also 
large. Firms with ATP have respectively 8%p, 12%p, and 10%p lower NI/Assets, NI/Equity, and 
EBIT/Sales than those without it. In our regressions, we include lagged profitability to control for any 
auto-correlation in corporate performance, and to control for firm behavior adopting ATP after 
experiencing poor performance. Regressions are estimated over the 1999-2009 period using nonfinancial 
firms listed on the Korea Exchange. t-values are based on standard errors clustered by firm.  
 
Cash Dividend Payouts 
 
If entrenched managers use up corporate resources in value-destroying projects, the firm would run out of 
earnings that can be distributed out to shareholders as cash dividends. We test this in Table 8 Panel B. 
When using firm fixed effects model, we do not find strong evidence on this. The coefficient on ATP is 
negative and marginally significant when we regress dividend/sales (see regression (1)). But, coefficients 
turn insignificant once we switch to other measures of dividend payout (see regressions (2) and (3)).  
The results, however, become stronger when we move to industry fixed effects model. We find 
evidence that cash dividend payouts drop with the introduction of anti-takeover measures. For example, 
the coefficient on ATP is negative and statistically significant when ln[(Dividend/Sales) + 1] is used as 
our dependent variable (see regression (4)). The coefficient of -0.0027 indicates that with the adoption of 
ATP, [(Dividend/Sales) +1] drops by 0.27 percent. If the original [Dividend/Sales] is 0.02, a drop in 
[(Dividend/Sales) +1] by 0.27 percent means a drop in [Dividend/Sales] by 13.77 percent, which is a huge 
drop in dividend payout.24  
In column 7, we investigate whether anti-takeover measures drop the fraction of dividend paying 
firms. It shows the result of random effects Probit regression, where Positive Dividend (1 if a firm pays 
dividend, and 0 otherwise) is the binary dependent variable. As expected, the coefficient on ATP is 
negative and highly significant. The economic magnitude is also large. The coefficient of -0.686 indicates 
that a firm’s chance of paying dividend drop by approximately 70 percent upon the adoption of anti-
                                                 
24
 Equation 1.02 x (1 - 0.0027) – 1 = 1.0172 = 0.02 x (1 – A) holds when A = 0.1377. 
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takeover measure. Overall, we conclude that firms that adopt anti-takeover provisions experience lower 
dividend payout during the post-adoption period.  
 
Delisting during the Global Financial Crisis 
 
Lastly, we test how firms with ATP fared during the global financial crisis by investigating the delisted 
firms either in 2009 or 2010. If entrenched managers engaged in negative NPV projects and thereby 
lowered profitability, we can predict that they would fare worse than those without ATPs. Table 9 shows 
the Probit regression results where Delist (1 if firms delisted either in 2009 or 2010, and 0 otherwise) is 
the binary dependent variable. Column (1) includes 2-digit industry dummies, while column (2) includes 
4-digit industry dummies.25 Point estimates denote marginal effects on probability. As expected, the 
coefficient on ATP is positive and highly significant, indicating that firms with charter-based anti-
takeover provisions fared worse than those without it during the global financial crisis. The coefficient of 
0.0311 (in column (2)) suggests that an adoption of ATP increases the probability of delisting by 3.11%p. 
Given that the sample mean of delisting was 10% in 2009, this can be considered as a substantial increase 
in delisting probability. In Table 9, we also find that firm size, leverage, cash holdings, and advertising 
expenditure, and operating profit also matter. As expected, firms with smaller size, higher leverage, 
smaller cash holdings, and lower profitability have higher chances of delisting. 
 
C. Two Endogeneity Problems 
 
Table 3 shows that firms with certain characteristics are more likely to adopt anti-takeover provisions. 
That is, firms that have low inside ownership, low foreign ownership, small firm size, or small cash 
holdings are more likely to adopt ATPs. This suggests that our ATP dummy is not truly exogenous and its 
coefficient can be biased by self-selection problem. Another possibility is the reverse causality problem. 
That is, firm performance (or other dependent variables) influencing ATP adoption, and not vice versa. 
The argument is that poorly performing firms may adopt ATPs for fear of hostile takeover and this leads 
to a negative relationship between the two (see Core, Guay, and Rusticus 2006, Lehn, Patro, and Zhao 
2007). In this subsection, we address these two endogeneity issues.  
 
Subsamples by Propensity Score 
 
                                                 
25
 We do not include firm fixed effects since it would worsen the incidental parameters problem (unconditional 
fixed effects Probit estimates are biased). Random-effects and population-average Probit models did not converge.  
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One obvious solution to the self-selection problem is to control for firm characteristics that influence the 
ATP adoption decision, which we do in all of our analyses. One can go a step further and run the 
regressions using a subsample of firms that share similar characteristics. Table 10 shows the results. We 
first obtain the fitted probabilities from Table 3 Regression (2), where we estimate a Probit model that 
predicts the likelihood of ATP adoption. In other words, we obtained the propensity score of each firm-
year observations. Second, we drop the bottom half observations in terms of propensity score and 
estimate again our two key regressions (Regression (6) in Tables 5 and 6). By dropping the bottom half, 
we are in effect using a control group (ATP non-adopters) that is much closer to the treatment group 
(ATP adopters) in terms of their ATP adoption likelihood.26  
Our key results remain intact when using this subsample. The coefficients on the interaction terms 
are positive (negative) when regression for firm value (capital expenditure). As a robustness check, we 
also tried thresholds other than the 50 percentile value. We tried 75 and 90 percentile values. Higher 
thresholds mean that we are limiting our control group firms so that they are much closer to the firms in 
the treatment group, in terms of ATP adoption likelihood. The coefficients have the expected signs and, in 
most cases, they are statistically significant.  
 
GMM System Estimation 
 
One solution to the reverse causality problem is to control for lagged performance variables on the right-
hand side of our regression, which we do whenever Tobin’s q or accounting profitability measures are 
regressed. We go a step further here and conduct GMM system estimation following Blundell and Bond 
(1990), where lags of dependent variables, lags of their first differences, lags of endogenous variable 
(ATP), and first differences of exogenous variables are used as instruments.27  
Table 11 replicates our key regressions (Regressions (2) and (6) in Tables 5 and 6) by using GMM 
system estimation. Note that the lag of one year was sufficient to make the error term serially uncorrelated. 
                                                 
26
 This approach, however, is different from a typical propensity score matching (PSM) method, where each 
individual observation in the treatment group is matched with an observation (or multiple observations) in the 
control group. We opt to take our ad hoc approach because the nature of our data did not meet the common support 
condition that is necessary to use the PSM method. In other words, our data does not ensure that firms with the same 
characteristics have a positive probability of being both ATP adopters and non-adopters. See Caliendo and Kopeinig 
(2005) for details on PSM method.  
27
 We do not estimate two-stage least squares (2SLS). This is because we could not identify a valid instrument that 
is exogenous, correlated with ATP, but not with firm performance variables. Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell 
(2010) also use GMM regression approach to address the endogeneity problem when studying entrenched manager’s 
value-decreasing acquisitions.  
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Our principal results remain intact. That is, ATP destroys firm value and increases capital expenditure 
when inside ownership is low.  
 
D. Alternative Hypothesis and Counter Evidence 
 
Despite our robustness tests using propensity scores and GMM system estimation, one may still easily 
come up with an alternative story that can explain some of the results in this paper. Suppose there is a 
firm expecting lower profitability in the future, for a reason other than the adoption of ATP. Foreseeing 
lower firm value and a higher takeover possibility, this firm may adopt ATP. One can also imagine that 
such tendency would be greater for firms with low inside ownership. Ex post, the profitability of this firm 
falls, as expected. Consequently, the firm value and the dividend payouts also fall. With poor 
performance, this firm will also be hit harder by the global financial crisis and eventually get delisted in 
subsequent years.  
This alternative story, however, is not consistent with two other pieces of evidence presented in this 
paper. First, it cannot explain why firms increase capital expenditure after the adoption of ATP. Firms 
with poor business prospects and low retained earnings should invest less. But, in this paper, we show 
that firms that are more likely to suffer from managerial entrenchment – firms with low inside ownership 
– increase capital expenditure after the adoption of ATP. Second, the alternative hypothesis cannot 
explain why inside ownership matters within the ATP-adopted firms. Inside ownership may influence the 
ATP-adoption decision, but it is hard to imagine why firms that have already adopted ATPs would suffer 
more if inside ownership level is low. Under the alternative story, given the assumption that inside 
ownership and ATPs are substitutes, the opposite is more likely. That is, firms with high inside ownership 
would adopt ATP only if their business prospect is extremely bad. On the contrary, firms with low inside 
ownership would adopt ATP even if their business prospect is only modestly bad. In this case, the extent 





Managerial entrenchment is a topic widely studied in the field of corporate finance. But, empirically 
quantifying the entrenchment effect has not been an easy task. The time-invariance of anti-takeover 
provisions, the shadow pill problem, and the endogeneity of their adoptions are the key challenges. In this 
paper, we try to address those challenges by making use of a unique situation in Korea. With the removal 
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of statute-based anti-takeover provisions during the aftermath of the Asian crisis, a significant number of 
Korean firms started to introduce charter-based anti-takeover measures, such as supermajority 
requirement on director dismissals, golden parachutes, supermajority requirement on mergers, and so on. 
This provides a setting where anti-takeover provisions vary over time, allowing us to investigate the 
relationship in a firm fixed effects framework. Also, given that all the provisions newly introduced are 
charter-based that require shareholders’ approval, we are not subject to the shadow pill problem that often 
plagues U.S. studies. Moreover, their adoption at the shareholders’ meeting is an unexpected news item 
that constitutes a valid event, allowing one to conduct meaningful event studies. Firm fixed effects 
regressions and event studies help us identify the causal effect by investigating whether the value of ATP-
adopting firms fall when it should (identification in time).   
Using public firms in Korea over 1999-2009, we find a number of interesting results. First, we find 
that firms with lower inside ownership, lower foreign ownership, smaller firm size, or lower cash 
holdings are more likely to adopt charter-based anti-takeover measures. Second, our event studies and 
firm fixed effects regressions show that firms with anti-takeover provisions experience lower firm value 
during the post-adoption period. We also find that the extent of such share price drop is greater for firms 
with low inside ownership, suggesting that the level of inside ownership and charter-based anti-takeover 
measures are substitutes. Third, consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis of Jensen (1986), we find 
that firms with anti-takeover measures experience higher capital expenditures, lower profitability, and 
lower dividend payouts. Fourth, by investigating delisted firms either in 2009 or 2010, we find that firms 
with anti-takeover provisions fared poorly during the global financial crisis, compared to those without 
such provisions. Lastly, we confirm that our principal results remain intact even when we control for self-
selection and reverse causality problems.  
Our result also sheds light on the current policy debate in Korea over the adoption of poison pill. 
Based on the findings in our paper, we expect that the introduction of poison pill will also have an 
entrenchment effect. Given that poison pill is seen as a stronger defense tool than the ones we study in 
this paper, we also conjecture that it would have a stronger entrenchment effect. 
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Figure 1: Number of Firms with Anti-Takeover Charter Provisions 
 
The dark grey bars in the first chart represent cumulative number of nonfinancial listed companies that have at least 
one anti-takeover charter provisions over a period of 1999-2009. The light grey bars use firms that exist throughout 
the 1999-2008 period. The second bar chart counts the number of delisted nonfinancial companies by year during 
the sample period. We split the sample of delisted firms into those with at least one anti-takeover charter provisions 










Figure 2: Announcement Effect of Anti-Takeover Charter Amendments 
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The figures show cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) before and after the adoption of anti-takeover 
charter provisions. The first figure (A) uses the full sample of firms. The second figure (B) limits to firms with 
inside ownership less than 10 percent. The third figure (C) limits to firms with market capitalization above 50 billion 
won (approximately 50 million US dollars). The fourth (D) and the fifth (E) figures further restrict the sample to 
ATP adopters that did not experience the drop in NI/Assets over the mediate past year. We report the CAARs from 
day -10 through day +20. The event day is the day of shareholders’ meeting. Abnormal returns are estimated from 
market model using past 250 trading days from day -260 to -11. The sample period is from 2001 to 2009. 
 
A. Full Sample 
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D. Inside Ownership < 10% 
(Do not experience fall in NI/Assets) 
E. Market Capitalization > 50 Billion Won 
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Table 1: Types of Anti-Takeover Charter Provisions 
 
Types of anti-takeover charter provisions and the number of firms with such provisions over the sample period 
(2001-2009). 
 
Types of Anti-Takeover Charter Provisions No. of firms  
Supermajority requirement on director dismissals 197  
Prohibiting the dismissal of directors above a certain percentage  33  
Golden parachutes  130  
Supermajority requirement on mergers  12 
Supermajority requirement on control-related charter amendments 119  
Delaying the effective date of control-related charter amendments 23  





Table 2: Principal Variables 
 
Definition and summary statistics of principal dependent and independent variables used in this paper. Panel A 
defines each variable. Panel B provides summary statistics. We use nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Exchange 
(formally, split between KSE and KOSDAQ) during 1999-2009. Firms with negative book equity values are 
dropped. When scaling profits and dividends with total assets, we use the average between beginning-of-the-year 
and end-of-the-year asset values. 
 
Panel A. Variable Definitions 
Variables Definition 
Dependent variables  
Firm Value ln(Tobins’ q) measured at year-end. Tobin’s q is defined as [(market value of common 
equity + book value of debt)/book value of assets]  
Capital Expenditure  ln(CAPEX/previous fiscal year’s total assets); firms with missing data are assumed to 
have zero CAPEX 
EBIT/Sale  Earnings before interest and tax /sales; winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile 
values 
NI/Asset  Net income/total assets; winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile values 
NI/Equity  Net income/book value of common equity; firms with negative values of book equity 
are dropped; winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile values 
Dividend/Sale  ln[(Dividend/sales) + 1]; missing values are treated as zero dividends; winsorized at the 
1st and the 99th percentile values 
Dividend /Asset  ln[(Dividend/assets + 1]; missing values are treated as zero ; winsorized at the 1st and 
the 99th percentile values 
Dividend /Equity  ln[(Dividend/book value of equity) + 1]; missing values are treated as zero; firms with 
negative values of book equity are dropped; winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile 
values 
Positive Dividend 1 if a firm pays out dividend, 0 otherwise 
Delist 1 if delisted in either in 2009 or 2010, and 0 otherwise 
RHS variables  
ATP 1 if anti-takeover provision exists, 0 otherwise 
ATP N 1 if at least N number of anti-takeover provision exists, and 0 otherwise 
ATP Index Number of anti-takeover provisions that exist  
Inside Ownership [Common shares held by the controlling shareholder and its related parties / common 
shares outstanding] x 100 
Foreign Ownership [Common shares held by foreign investors / common shares outstanding] x 100 
Operating Profit ln[(EBIT/Asset) + 1]  
Growth Opportunity ln(Tobins’ q) measured at year-end. Tobin’s q is defined as [(market value of common
 equity + book value of debt)/book value of assets] 
Firm Size ln(Total assets); total assets are measured in million won (approximately thousand US 
dollars) 
Firm Age Number of years since a firm’s establishment, measured by ln(year – year of 
establishment); 
Leverage ln[(Book value of debt/market value of common stock) + 1] 
Cash Holdings ln(Cash and cash equivalents/total assets); winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile 
values 
R&D Expenditure ln[(R&D/Sales) + 1]; winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values 
Advertising 
Expenditure 
ln[(Advertising/Sales) + 1] 
Sales Growth Geometric average growth rate of sales during the past two fiscal years. 
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Tobin’s q 15,522  1.27 0.95 1.69 0.02 102.86 1.15 1.48 1.58 1.72
ln(Tobin’s q) 15,522  0.04 -0.05 0.53 -4.06 4.63 -0.03 0.19 0.24 0.30
Capital Expenditure  17,377  -3.53 -3.40 1.55 -13.81 2.86 -3.51 -3.81 -4.02 -4.20
EBIT/Sale  18,424  -0.01 0.05 0.30 -1.82 0.40 0.04 -0.13 -0.24 -0.41
NI/Asset  17,449  -0.01 0.03 0.23 -1.21 0.37 0.03 -0.13 -0.22 -0.36
NI/Equity  17,012  -0.04 0.07 0.48 -2.63 0.74 0.03 -0.26 -0.43 -0.66
Dividend/Sale  18,424  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dividend /Asset  17,449  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dividend /Equity  17,012  0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00
Positive Dividend 18,435  0.48 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.62 0.32 0.20 0.11
Delist 1,752 167 0.10 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.22 0.32 0.46
ATP 18,435 881 0.05 0.00 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.12 0.17 0.22
ATP 2 18,435 504 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.07 0.10 0.14
ATP 3 18,435 242 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.08
ATP 4 18,435 65 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04
ATP 5 18,435 1 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ATP 6 18,435 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ATP Index 18,435  0.09 0.00 0.46 0.00 5.00 0.04 0.24 0.35 0.48
Inside Ownership 16,142  39.22 38.26 18.32 0.00 100.00 48.96 19.23 12.91 6.51
Foreign Ownership 16,142  5.76 0.39 11.78 0.00 107.21 5.75 5.78 5.17 4.71
Operating Profit 17,449  0.00 0.03 0.05 0.13 -0.52 0.32 0.05 -0.03 -0.07
Firm Size 18,430  11.24 11.01 1.52 4.85 18.27 11.46 11.30 11.18 11.02
Firm Age 18,286  2.82 3.00 0.85 0.00 4.71 2.97 2.87 2.89 2.93
Leverage 15,510  0.87 0.63 0.88 0.00 12.26 0.82 0.95 1.03 1.22
Cash Holdings 17,449  0.07 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.91 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06
R&D Expenditure 18,424  0.03 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.29 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03
Advertising Expenditure 18,417  1.33 0.87 1.30 0.00 10.53 1.27 1.48 1.56 1.65




Table 3: Which Firms Choose to Adopt Anti-Takeover Measures? 
 
Industry fixed effects Probit regression of ATP (1 if anti-takeover provision exits, 0 otherwise) on ownership 
variables, operating profit, firm size, and other control variables. Point estimates denote marginal effects on 
probability. Regressions are estimated over the 1999-2009 period using a sample of nonfinancial firms. Regressions 
(1) and (2) respectively include 2-digit and 4-digit industry fixed effects. All regressions use year dummies. t-values, 
in the parenthesis, are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are shown in boldface.  
 
Dependent Variable = ATP (1) (2) 
Inside Ownership  -0.0006*** -0.0004*** 
 (-10.20) (-11.22) 
Foreign Ownership -0.0002* -0.0002** 
 (-1.69) (-2.33) 
Firm Size  -0.0034*** -0.0030*** 
 (-4.57) (-5.26) 
Firm Age  -0.0001 0.0004 
 (-0.10) (0.40) 
Leverage  -0.0009 0.0001 
 (-0.88) (0.14) 
Cash Holdings -0.0127** -0.0098** 
 (-1.98) (-2.05) 
R&D Expenditure -0.0023 -0.0001 
 (-0.20) (-0.01) 
Advertising Expenditure  0.0009* 0.0006 
 (1.65) (1.44) 
Operating Profit -0.0048 -0.0031 
 (-1.07) (-0.89) 
Intercept term Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects 2-digit 4-digit 
Observations 14,138 13,513 





Table 4: Announcement Effect of Anti-Takeover Charter Amendments 
 
This table shows cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) before and after the adoption of anti-takeover 
charter provisions. In the first four columns ((1)-(4)), we report CAARs and their corresponding t-stats when using 
the full sample of firms (203 firms on day 0). In the next four columns ((5)-(8)), we report the results when limiting 
to firms with inside ownership less than 10 percent (29 firms on day 0). In the last four columns ((9)-(12)), we report 
the results when limiting to firms with market capitalization above 50 billion won (approximately 50 million won, 
52 firms on day 0). In columns (1), (2), (5), (6), (9), and (10), we cumulate AARs from day -10. In all other columns, 
we cumulate AARs from day 0. The event day is the day of shareholders’ meeting. Abnormal returns are estimated 
from market model using past 250 trading days from day -260 to -11. The sample period is from 2001 to 2009. *, **, 
and *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
Day 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Full Sample Inside Ownership < 10% Market Capitalization > 50 billion won 
[-10, t] [0, t] [-10, t] [0, t] [-10, t] [0, t] 






t-stat CAAR (%) t-stat 
-10 0.27  (0.77)    -0.05 (0.05)  0.54  (0.91)    
-9 0.48  (0.95)    -1.12 (0.80)  0.44  (0.52)    
-8 0.63  (1.01)    -0.13 (0.08)  0.39  (0.37)    
-7 0.33  (0.46)    -0.74 (0.37)  0.40  (0.33)    
-6 -0.09  (0.11)    -1.66 (0.75)  0.82  (0.61)    
-5 -0.06  (0.07)    -1.59 (0.66)  1.62  (1.11)    
-4 0.14  (0.15)    -0.52 (0.20)  1.39  (0.88)    
-3 -0.42  (0.42)    -1.62 (0.58)  1.67  (0.99)    
-2 -0.16  (0.15)    -2.48 (0.84)  1.75  (0.98)    
-1 0.58  (0.51)    -2.59 (0.83)  1.68  (0.89)    
0 0.56  (0.47) 0.04  (0.12) -3.47 (1.06) -0.88 (0.89) 1.33  (0.67) -0.37  (0.64)
1 -0.12  (0.09) -0.78  (1.57) -4.46 (1.30) -1.87 (1.34) 0.62  (0.30) -1.32  (1.60)
2 -0.70  (0.54) -1.44 *** (2.38) -5.76 (1.62) -3.17 * (1.85) -0.74  (0.35) -2.66 *** (2.63)
3 -0.90  (0.67) -1.58 ** (2.26) -5.83 (1.58) -3.24 * (1.64) -1.53  (0.68) -3.56 *** (3.05)
4 -1.39  (1.00) -1.96 *** (2.50) -5.29 (1.38) -2.70 (1.22) -2.05  (0.89) -4.03 *** (3.09)
5 -1.43  (1.00) -1.95 ** (2.27) -5.56 (1.41) -2.97 (1.23) -1.87  (0.79) -3.59 *** (2.52)
6 -1.07  (0.73) -1.62 * (1.74) -5.26 (1.29) -2.67 (1.02) -1.81  (0.74) -3.50 ** (2.27)
7 -0.98  (0.65) -1.56  (1.58) -7.06 * (1.68) -4.47 (1.60) -2.54  (1.00) -4.15 *** (2.52)
8 -1.11  (0.71) -1.75 * (1.66) -8.01 * (1.86) -5.42 * (1.83) -2.71  (1.04) -4.34 *** (2.48)
9 -1.16  (0.73) -1.82 * (1.65) -8.00 * (1.81) -5.41 * (1.73) -1.72  (0.64) -3.51 * (1.90)
10 -1.45  (0.88) -2.05 * (1.76) -8.69 * (1.92) -6.10 * (1.86) -2.40  (0.88) -4.20 ** (2.17)
11 -1.67  (0.99) -2.07 * (1.71) -7.71 * (1.67) -5.12 (1.50) -2.52  (0.90) -4.19 ** (2.07)
12 -1.64  (0.95) -1.91  (1.51) -8.35 * (1.76) -5.76 (1.62) -2.52  (0.88) -4.06 * (1.93)
13 -1.72  (0.98) -2.02  (1.55) -7.68 (1.59) -5.09 (1.38) -2.39  (0.82) -3.94 * (1.81)
14 -1.80  (1.01) -2.18  (1.61) -5.83 (1.18) -3.24 (0.85) -2.58  (0.86) -4.12 * (1.82)
15 -2.46  (1.34) -2.84 ** (2.03) -7.41 (1.47) -4.82 (1.22) -3.26  (1.07) -4.69 ** (2.01)
16 -2.63  (1.41) -2.83 ** (1.96) -7.25 (1.41) -4.66 (1.14) -3.74  (1.21) -4.86 ** (2.02)
17 -2.59  (1.37) -2.85 * (1.92) -8.45 (1.62) -5.86 (1.40) -4.31  (1.37) -5.39 ** (2.18)
18 -3.18 * (1.65) -3.44 ** (2.26) -8.87 * (1.67) -6.28 (1.46) -4.70  (1.46) -5.95 *** (2.34)
19 -3.01  (1.54) -3.43 ** (2.19) -9.31 * (1.72) -6.72 (1.52) -4.79  (1.47) -6.30 *** (2.42)






Table 5: Anti-Takeover Charter Amendments and Firms’ Market Value 
 
Firm fixed effect regressions of firm’s market value on ATP and other control variables. Regressions are estimated over the 1999-2009 period using 
nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Exchange. Regressions (2) to (5) report sub-sample results, grouped by the level of inside ownership. Regression (6) 
adds inside ownership and its interaction with ATP. All regressions use year dummies. t-values, in the parenthesis, are based on standard errors clustered by 
firm. *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are shown in boldface. 
 
Dependent Variable = ln(Tobin’s q) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Full Sample Sub-Sample by Inside Ownership Full Sample 
 >30% <30% <20% <10% 
ATP -0.0405 0.0468 -0.1062*** -0.1860*** -0.2657** -0.1402*** 
 (-1.41) (1.03) (-2.76) (-3.72) (-2.12) (-3.19) 
x Inside Ownership   
 
  0.0037*** 
   
 
  (2.66) 
Inside Ownership   
 
  -0.0028*** 
   
 
  (-6.04) 
Firm Value (t-1) 0.1904*** 0.1610*** 0.0810*** 0.0067 -0.0967 0.1839*** 
 (13.60) (9.15) (3.44) (0.21) (-1.56) (13.19) 
Foreign Ownership 0.0045*** 0.0035*** 0.0060*** 0.0049* 0.0073 0.0044*** 
 (5.76) (3.87) (3.74) (1.84) (1.43) (5.84) 
Firm Size  -0.1435*** -0.0201 -0.2912*** -0.3569*** -0.3881*** -0.1473*** 
 (-8.80) (-0.95) (-10.92) (-9.12) (-4.24) (-9.11) 
Firm Age  -0.0138 0.0100 -0.2063*** -0.3510*** -0.8875* -0.0252 
 (-0.44) (0.26) (-2.94) (-3.19) (-1.87) (-0.80) 
Leverage  -0.0935*** -0.1589*** -0.0560*** -0.0573** -0.0593 -0.0985*** 
 (-8.36) (-10.83) (-3.02) (-2.07) (-1.01) (-8.76) 
Cash Holdings 0.2824*** 0.2423** 0.2891** 0.2262 0.5319 0.2723*** 
 (3.49) (2.52) (2.25) (1.28) (1.27) (3.38) 
R&D Expenditure 0.0048 -0.1978 -0.0417 -0.2195 -0.8149 -0.0103 
 (0.03) (-0.76) (-0.22) (-0.81) (-1.43) (-0.06) 
Advertising Expenditure  0.0106 0.0085 0.0064 0.0179 -0.0183 0.0103 
 (1.41) (0.88) (0.57) (1.22) (-0.46) (1.39) 
Operating Profit -0.1719*** 0.2365** -0.1894** -0.2116** -0.5774*** -0.1240** 
 (-2.97) (2.51) (-2.30) (-2.18) (-2.70) (-2.15) 
Intercept term Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of firm-years 14,221 9,332 4,889 2,427 684 14,221 
No. of firms 1,918 1,587 1,077 704 325 1,918 




Table 6: Anti-Takeover Charter Amendments and Capital Expenditure 
 
Firm fixed effects regression of capital expenditure on ATP and other control variables. Regressions (2) to (5) reports sub-sample results, grouped by the level 
of inside ownership. Regression (6) adds inside ownership and its interaction term with ATP. Regressions are estimated over the 1999-2009 period using 
nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Exchange. All regressions use year dummies. t-values, in the parenthesis, are based on standard errors clustered by firm. 
*, **, and *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are shown in boldface. 
  
Dependent Variable  
= ln(CAPEX/Assets)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Full Sample Sub-Sample by Inside Ownership Full Sample 
 >=30% <30% <20% <10% 
ATP -0.0586 -0.2460* -0.0080 0.3044** 0.7994*** 0.2275 
 (-0.69) (-1.89) (-0.07) (2.03) (2.94) (1.48) 
x Inside Ownership      -0.0116** 
      (-2.37) 
Inside Ownership      0.0040*** 
      (2.59) 
Growth Opportunity 0.1898*** 0.2503*** 0.0499 -0.0302 -0.2366 0.1998*** 
 (5.09) (5.48) (0.75) (-0.33) (-1.43) (5.38) 
Foreign Ownership 0.0018 0.0001 0.0055* 0.0079* 0.0161 0.0018 
 (1.00) (0.02) (1.79) (1.74) (1.59) (1.01) 
Firm Size  0.4103*** 0.4062*** 0.4558*** 0.5630*** 0.7095*** 0.4227*** 
 (9.42) (6.73) (6.32) (5.14) (4.15) (9.63) 
Firm Age  -0.9364*** -0.6599*** -1.3812*** -1.7667*** -2.6038** -0.9205*** 
 (-8.62) (-4.92) (-7.69) (-7.03) (-2.34) (-8.48) 
Leverage  -0.1854*** -0.0748** -0.2365*** -0.2342*** -0.1533* -0.1773*** 
 (-7.32) (-2.48) (-6.14) (-4.54) (-1.79) (-7.02) 
Cash Holdings 0.1960 -0.2172 0.6186* 0.5560 0.9052 0.2071 
 (0.92) (-0.83) (1.84) (1.18) (0.88) (0.97) 
R&D Expenditure 1.0980** 1.1237 0.6014 0.6494 1.4549 1.1238** 
 (1.98) (1.45) (0.81) (0.69) (1.06) (2.04) 
Advertising Expenditure  0.1385*** 0.1494*** 0.1438*** 0.0588 0.0363 0.1382*** 
 (4.90) (3.55) (3.47) (1.12) (0.35) (4.90) 
Operating Profit 1.2681*** 1.7813*** 0.4869** 0.3059 -0.1488 1.1978*** 
 (7.57) (7.20) (1.99) (1.01) (-0.23) (7.00) 
Intercept term Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of firm-years 15,266 10,166 5,100 2,467 682 15,266 
No. of firms 1,978 1,692 1,093 712 323 1,978 
within R-sq 0.114 0.0943 0.146 0.176 0.247 0.116 
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Table 7: Capital Expenditure and Firms’ Market Value 
 
Firm fixed effects regression of firm’s market value on capital expenditure and other control variables. Regressions (1) and (6) respectively report sub-sample 
results for ATP non-adopters and ATP adopters. Regressions (2)-(5) and regressions (7)-(10) divide the sample further by the level of inside ownership. All 
regressions are estimated over the 1999-2009 period using nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Exchange. All regressions use year dummies. t-values, in the 
parenthesis, are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% 
level or better) are shown in boldface. 
 
Dependent Variable 
= ln(Tobin’s q) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ATP Non-Adopters ATP Adopters 
Full 
Sample 
Sub-Sample by Inside Ownership Full 
Sample 
Sub-Sample by Inside Ownership 
>30% <30% <20% <10% >30% <30% <20% <10% 
Capital Expenditure 0.0129*** 0.0174*** 0.0030 0.0039 0.0144 0.0207 0.0162 0.0151 -0.0056 -0.0879** 
 (3.61) (4.21) (0.41) (0.35) (0.63) (1.48) (0.54) (0.89) (-0.24) (-2.13) 
Firm value (t-1) 0.1777*** 0.1601*** 0.0521** -0.0228 -0.1345** -0.1256*** -0.2044*** -0.1580*** -0.1816*** -0.2925* 
 (12.17) (8.88) (2.15) (-0.70) (-1.98) (-3.05) (-2.73) (-3.10) (-3.07) (-1.80) 
Foreign Ownership 0.0044*** 0.0035*** 0.0064*** 0.0074*** 0.0085 0.0053 0.0036 0.0042 -0.0022 -0.0377 
 (5.54) (3.80) (4.29) (3.78) (1.55) (1.12) (0.42) (0.66) (-0.22) (-1.22) 
Firm Size -0.1368*** -0.0349 -0.2769*** -0.3466*** -0.4230*** -0.3504*** -0.1147 -0.4280*** -0.3955*** -0.2897 
 (-8.21) (-1.61) (-9.80) (-9.07) (-4.75) (-4.80) (-0.84) (-4.92) (-3.63) (-1.51) 
Firm Age 0.0045 0.0192 -0.1731** -0.2663** -0.7212 -0.3506 0.7451 -0.7915 -1.3565* -2.7011 
 (0.14) (0.50) (-2.37) (-2.20) (-1.50) (-0.91) (1.34) (-1.48) (-1.84) (-1.07) 
Leverage -0.0906*** -0.1543*** -0.0545*** -0.0443* -0.0741 -0.1660*** -0.2572** -0.1473** -0.2048*** -0.2306** 
 (-8.03) (-10.49) (-2.93) (-1.66) (-1.36) (-3.02) (-2.06) (-2.22) (-2.76) (-2.33) 
Cash Holdings 0.2903*** 0.2449** 0.3756*** 0.2500 0.3659 0.1287 -0.6410 0.1360 -0.0846 0.9603 
 (3.54) (2.50) (2.66) (1.19) (0.70) (0.52) (-1.46) (0.49) (-0.27) (1.29) 
R&D Expenditure -0.0913 -0.4099* -0.0214 -0.1065 -1.6047** 0.0022 2.7065 0.0353 -0.4134 2.2586 
 (-0.49) (-1.67) (-0.09) (-0.27) (-2.05) (0.01) (1.10) (0.08) (-0.66) (1.57) 
Advertising  0.0112 0.0021 0.0134 0.0338* 0.0442 -0.0083 0.0323 -0.0053 -0.0054 -0.0043 
Expenditure (1.44) (0.22) (1.07) (1.93) (1.28) (-0.33) (0.58) (-0.20) (-0.19) (-0.07) 
Operating Profit -0.1182* 0.2063** -0.1632* -0.2113* -0.5616*** -0.2979 -0.2079 -0.0459 -0.2253 -0.1436 
 (-1.96) (2.16) (-1.78) (-1.83) (-2.64) (-1.45) (-0.32) (-0.21) (-0.86) (-0.30) 
Intercept Term Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of firm-years 13,330 9,087 4,243 1,975 521 836 217 619 430 154 
No. of firms 1,892 1,557 1,024 637 269 248 93 206 166 82 




Table 8: Anti-Takeover Charter Amendments, Profitability, and Dividends 
 
Sample consists of nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Exchange during the sample period over 1999-2009. All regressions use year dummies. t-values, in the 
parenthesis, are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% 
level or better) are shown in boldface.  
 
Panel A. Fixed Effects Regressions of Profitability  
 
Firm fixed effects regressions of indicated profitability variables on ATP and other control variables. In Regression (2), we exclude firms with negative book 
equity values. All regressions use firm clusters. Profitability variables are all winsorized at 1%/99%. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variables NI/Asset NI/Equity EBIT/Sale 
ATP -0.0588*** -0.0771** -0.0622*** 
 (-4.27) (-2.43) (-3.64) 
Profitability (t-1) 0.1022*** 0.1069*** 0.3153*** 
 (5.86) (6.27) (15.13) 
Growth Opportunity -0.0890*** -0.2013*** -0.0218*** 
 (-13.66) (-13.12) (-2.75) 
Foreign Ownership 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 
 (0.49) (0.43) (0.69) 
Firm Size  0.1247*** 0.2239*** 0.0927*** 
 (17.06) (12.78) (10.10) 
Firm Age  -0.1281*** -0.2121*** -0.1234*** 
 (-6.91) (-5.37) (-6.56) 
Leverage  -0.0892*** -0.2251*** -0.0317*** 
 (-16.20) (-15.42) (-7.10) 
Cash Holdings 0.3545*** 0.6748*** 0.2751*** 
 (10.33) (9.61) (6.45) 
R&D Expenditure -0.3790*** -0.7070*** -1.4651*** 
 (-4.34) (-3.58) (-10.16) 
Advertising Expenditure  -0.0322*** -0.0562*** -0.0644*** 
 (-7.84) (-6.37) (-9.65) 
No. of firm-years 14,101 13,643 15,320 
No. of firms 1,932 1,902 1,980 
within R-sq 0.270 0.200 0.275 
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Panel B. Fixed Effects, Pooled OLS, and Probit Regressions of Dividends 
 
Firm fixed effects ((1) through (3)), industry fixed effects ((4) through (6)), and random effects Probit (7) regressions of indicated dividend variables. 
ln[(Dividend/Sales) + 1], ln[(Dividend/Asset) + 1], and ln[(Dividend/Equity) + 1] are winsorized at 1%/99%. Regressions (3) and (6) exclude firms with 
negative book equity values. When dividends are scaled by sales, we drop sales growth as a regressor.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Models Firm Fixed Effects  Probit 
Dependent Variables ln[(Dividend /Sale) + 1] 
ln[(Dividend 
/Asset) + 1] 
ln[(Dividend 
/Equity) + 1] 
ln[(Dividend 
/Sale) + 1] 
ln[(Dividend 
/Asset) + 1] 
ln[(Dividend 
/Equity) + 1] 
Positive 
Dividend 
ATP -0.0010* -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0027*** -0.0013*** -0.0014* -0.6858*** 
 (-1.86) (-0.16) (0.24) (-5.04) (-2.94) (-1.96) (-5.80) 
Sales Growth  0.0002* 0.0004**  -0.0004** -0.0006** -0.1343*** 
  (1.74) (1.96)  (-2.14) (-2.31) (-2.59) 
Foreign Ownership 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0101*** 
 (3.49) (5.60) (5.32) (4.34) (6.49) (5.57) (3.97) 
Firm Size  -0.0005 -0.0015*** -0.0020*** 0.0000 -0.0005*** 0.0001 0.4029*** 
 (-1.51) (-6.66) (-4.39) (0.10) (-3.11) (0.23) (11.99) 
Firm Age  -0.0047*** -0.0036*** -0.0038** -0.0002 -0.0006** -0.0016*** 0.1049* 
 (-4.58) (-3.89) (-2.46) (-0.45) (-2.38) (-3.80) (1.68) 
Leverage  -0.0013*** -0.0011*** -0.0022*** -0.0032*** -0.0024*** -0.0036*** -0.5768*** 
 (-7.50) (-7.18) (-7.34) (-13.00) (-13.10) (-11.64) (-17.53) 
Cash Holdings 0.0076*** 0.0072*** 0.0087*** 0.0080*** 0.0105*** 0.0112*** 0.3774 
 (3.88) (4.99) (3.99) (3.12) (5.22) (3.72) (1.28) 
R&D Expenditure 0.0028 -0.0053** -0.0080* 0.0079* -0.0061** -0.0164*** -0.5558 
 (0.58) (-2.00) (-1.91) (1.80) (-2.51) (-4.46) (-0.80) 
Advertising Expenditure 0.0004 0.0004*** 0.0007*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0422 
 (1.45) (3.32) (3.39) (0.67) (0.65) (0.08) (-1.52) 
Operating Profit 0.0190*** 0.0257*** 0.0466*** 0.0331*** 0.0375*** 0.0629*** 11.8032*** 
 (12.72) (19.42) (20.61) (18.93) (25.59) (26.48) (33.32) 
Intercept term Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies    4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 
No. of firm-years 15,321 14,849 14,497 15,321 14,849 14,497 14,849 
No. of firms 1,980 1,959 1,932 1,980 1,959 1,932 1,959 
Within R-sq 0.075 0.172 0.174     




Table 9: Firms Delisting during the Global Financial Crisis 
 
Probit regression of Delist (takes a value of 1 for firms delisted either in 2009 or 2010, and 0 otherwise) on ATP, 
industry fixed effects, and other control variables. Point estimates denote marginal effects on probability. Sample 
consists of nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Exchange as of year-end 2008. Regressions (1) and (2) 
respectively use 2-digit and 4-digit industry fixed effects. All regressions use year dummies. t-values, in the 
parenthesis, are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are shown in boldface. 
 
 Dependent Variable = Delist (1) (2) 
ATP 0.0352** 0.0311** 
(2.43) (2.14) 
Foreign Ownership 0.0004 0.0006 
 (0.66) (1.07) 
Firm Size  -0.0186*** -0.0217*** 
 (-2.58) (-2.99) 
Firm Age  -0.0182** -0.0136 
 (-2.44) (-1.44) 
Leverage  0.0340*** 0.0355*** 
 (4.37) (4.25) 
Cash Holdings -0.2616** -0.2973** 
(-2.31) (-2.53) 
R&D Expenditure -0.0596 -0.0678 
(-0.65) (-0.66) 
Advertising Expenditure  0.0087** 0.0093** 
(2.12) (2.16) 
Operating Profit -0.3243*** -0.3386*** 
  (-6.97) (-6.66) 
Intercept term Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies 2-digit 4-digit 
Observations 1,606 1,420 






Table 10: Subsample Results by Propensity Score 
 
Firm fixed effects regressions of firm’s market value ((1)-(3)) and capital expenditure ((4)-(6)) on ATP and control 
variables. Regressions (1) and (4) drop the bottom half observations in terms of propensity score obtained from 
Table 3 Regression (2). Regressions (2) and (5) drop observations below the 75th percentile values and regressions 
(3) and (6) drop those below the 90th percentile values. All regressions are estimated over the 1999-2009 period 
using nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Exchange. All regressions use year dummies. t-values, in the 
parenthesis, are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are shown in boldface. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable ln(Tobin’s q) ln(CAPEX/Assets) 
Propensity Score > 50th > 75th > 90th > 50th > 75th > 90th 
ATP -0.1612*** -0.1882*** -0.2354*** 0.2478 0.3991** 0.5730** 
 (-3.28) (-3.12) (-2.76) (1.51) (2.25) (2.50) 
x Inside Ownership 0.0038** 0.0040* 0.0042 -0.0113** -0.0173*** -0.0260** 
 (2.25) (1.69) (0.86) (-1.96) (-2.59) (-2.32) 
Inside Ownership -0.0024*** -0.0027** -0.0031** 0.0025 0.0033 0.0023 
 (-3.30) (-2.51) (-2.04) (1.12) (1.04) (0.56) 
Firm Value (t-1) 0.1214*** 0.0907*** 0.0757**    
 (7.32) (3.89) (2.49)    
Firm Value   
 




(2.13) (0.60) (0.88) 
Foreign Ownership 0.0049*** 0.0044** 0.0056** 0.0020 0.0074* 0.0020 
 (4.31) (2.46) (2.16) (0.67) (1.74) (0.33) 
Firm Size -0.2068*** -0.2464*** -0.2752*** 0.5329*** 0.5281*** 0.5985*** 
 (-9.86) (-9.01) (-7.08) (9.46) (7.51) (5.71) 
Firm Age 0.1009* 0.1882** 0.1040 -1.3772*** -1.5919*** -1.3135*** 
 (1.85) (2.12) (0.94) (-8.48) (-7.03) (-4.31) 
Leverage -0.0851*** -0.0781*** -0.1063*** -0.3469*** -0.3675*** -0.3724*** 
 (-4.73) (-3.31) (-3.38) (-8.14) (-6.56) (-4.87) 
Cash Holdings 0.1874* 0.1273 -0.1513 -0.0393 0.4316 0.3109 
 (1.78) (0.92) (-0.64) (-0.14) (1.28) (0.61) 
R&D Expenditure 0.1473 0.2886 0.3031 0.3123 1.3157 2.2184** 
 (0.72) (1.15) (0.87) (0.46) (1.42) (2.01) 
Advertising Expenditure 0.0065 0.0070 -0.0033 0.1103*** 0.0939** 0.1385** 
 (0.71) (0.58) (-0.20) (3.37) (2.09) (2.28) 
Operating Profit -0.1379** -0.2187*** -0.2571** 0.5199** 0.0965 0.0014 
 (-2.09) (-2.59) (-2.09) (2.46) (0.34) (0.00) 
Intercept Term Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of firm-years 8,066 4,855 2,931 8,533 5,164 3,144 
No. of firms 1,809 1,595 1,327 1,878 1,684 1,434 
No. of ATP adopted firm-years 869 760 526 869 760 526 
No. of ATP adopters 250 236 199 246 234 197 
within R-sq 0.275 0.278 0.315 0.157 0.172 0.199 




Table 11: GMM System Estimation 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation following Blundell and Bond (1998), where lags of dependent variables (firm value 
and capital expenditure), lags of their first differences, lags of endogenous variable (ATP), and first differences of 
exogenous variables are used as instruments. The model is fit by GMM. The test of no autocorrelation in first-
differenced errors appears at the bottom of the table. Regressions (1) and (2) regress firm value, while regressions (3) 
and (4) regress capital expenditure. Regressions (1) and (3) restrict the sample to those with inside ownership greater 
than 30%, while regressions (2) and (4) restrict to those with less than 10%. All regressions are estimated for over 
the 1999-2009 period using nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Exchange. All regressions use year dummies. z-
values, in the parenthesis, are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are shown in boldface. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable ln(Tobin’s q) ln(CAPEX/Assets) 
 >=30% <10% >=30% <10% 
ATP 0.1142* -0.3295** 0.6423 1.2210** 
 (1.89) (-2.04) (0.65) (2.51) 
Firm Value (t-1) 0.2658*** 0.0909   
 (8.47) (1.35)   
Capital Expenditure (t-1)   0.3319*** 0.1979*** 
   (8.75) (2.64) 
Foreign Ownership 0.0052*** 0.0036 -0.0009 0.0085 
 (3.04) (0.38) (-0.27) (0.70) 
Firm Size  -0.0174 -0.4273*** 0.8236*** 0.5838** 
 (-0.66) (-5.09) (5.17) (2.42) 
Firm Age  0.1929*** 0.5127*** -0.7118** -0.7837 
 (5.18) (2.71) (-2.42) (-1.50) 
Leverage  -0.2124*** -0.1799*** -0.0580 -0.4496*** 
 (-8.14) (-4.59) (-1.11) (-4.36) 
Cash Holdings 0.1653 -0.2905 -0.6749 -0.9360 
 (1.07) (-0.89) (-1.34) (-0.93) 
R&D Expenditure -0.2797 -0.0083 -1.2874 -0.2783 
 (-0.67) (-0.01) (-0.93) (-0.18) 
Advertising Expenditure  0.0080 -0.0022 0.1139** 0.1042 
 (0.51) (-0.06) (2.51) (1.07) 
Operating Profit -0.0083 -0.4775*** 1.0184*** -0.7405 
 (-0.07) (-2.82) (3.18) (-1.30) 
Intercept term Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of firm-years 8,812 633 9,242 616 
No. of firms 1,558 307 1,618 300 
z-value (at order 1) -8.980 -3.496 -12.61 -3.632 
z-value (at order 2) 1.127 0.808 1.344 0.548 
 
 
 
